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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLINE P. JENSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
GEORGIAN CORPORATION, 
INCORPORATED, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 8708 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant appeals from the verdict of the jury 
rendered against her in the court below where she ap-
peared as plaintiff. She bases her appeal upon certain rul-
ings of the trial court on evidentiary matters and upon 
one of the instructions to the jury and upon other instruc-
tions requested by her but not given as requested. 
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The respondent concedes that many of the facts 
contained in appellant's brief are correctly stated but 
does not and cannot subscribe fully to the appellant's 
statement of facts and in particular to the construction 
which appellant places upon certain aspects of the evi-
dence. 
We will hereafter refer to the parties as they appeared 
below. 
It is agreed that the relation of landlord and tenant 
existed between the parties and that upon the defendant's 
premises laundry facilities had been provided by defendant 
for the use of plaintiff and its other tenants. At the time 
of her injury no one was present but the plaintiff and her 
daughter. The only testimony in the record is to the effect 
that plaintiff was injured when she tripped on a clean-opt 
plug located in one of the rooms in the laundry area. This 
plug was screwed into the top of the sewer line which ran 
beneath the cement floor of the room. The plug itself was 
metal and was flush with the floor except for a wrench 
shoulder or collar about one inch square which protruded 
above the floor surface a distance of one inch. The wrench 
shoulder of the plug made it possible to remove the clean-
out plug in case of necessity. At the time of her injury the 
plaintiff and her daughter were in the process of doing the 
family wash. 
In addition to the foregoing facts which are not 
disputed, the following facts, largely ignored or brushed 
aside in plaintiff's brief, are of importance to a proper 
consideration of the matters urged by plaintiff as grounds 
for reversal. 
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This clean-out plug had been installed in the de-
fendant's premises at the time the building, an apartment 
house, was constructed. The installation was in accordance 
with plans and specifications prepared by a firm of li-
censed architects of long experience in the construction 
of all types of buildings. It was also installed and main-
tained in obedience to the Provo City Plumbing Code. It 
met the standards of good and accepted construction 
practices, was properly located and was of the exact type 
specified by the Plumbing Code. (Tr. 209, 210, 231, 25'5-
258, 261-262,264-266, 277-279,288-291 and 293, Exhibit 
D-12) 
This plug was located in the laundry area as indicated 
on plaintiff's Exhibit P-1 and was the only clean-out in 
the entire area which consisted of three rooms. The east 
and west rooms of the laundry were equipped with wash-
ing machines and tubs and the center room was for drying 
clothes and had clothes lines. Clothes lines were placed in 
all three areas for the use of tenants. (Tr. 31, 44, 78, 196, 
202) 
While it is not urged by defendant that plaintiff was 
forbidden to use the west laundry room where she was 
injured, it is, nevertheless, a fact that she could have done 
her laundry without ever entering this west room. She had 
been assigned by defendant's manager to do her laundry in 
the east washroom, where the washing facilities were 
better and more convenient for her to use, where there was 
no clean-out plug. (Tr. 22, 31, 35, 39, 44, 71, 78, 88, 
159, 196, 202, 215) 
Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the clean-out plug 
was not in the direct path of travel of tenants using the 
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laundry. They were not under any necessity of stepping 
over the plug in order to use the area. It was so located as 
to be plainly visible and easily avoided by anyone exercising 
reasonable care. (Tr. 77, 24, 28, 30, 43, 53, 76, 155, 198, 
199, 212, Exhibit P-1) Plaintiff made no attempt to show 
that the clean-out plug should or could have been located 
in any other place than where it was. The demands of the 
sewer system and the Code required it to be located in the 
exact spot where it was placed. (Tr. 209, 210, 231, 264, 
269, 277, 278, 281, 289, 290, 291) 
The plaintiff herself was well aware of the existence 
and location of this plug. She and other witnesses testi-
fied that sometime before the accident she had tripped on 
it without falling. (Tr. 119-121, 189, 199, 200) She also 
claims that she had knowledge of others likewise tripping 
on it. (Tr. 283) 
Plaintiff was uncertain whether she should describe 
the defendant's premises as being dangerous because of 
the drainplug. Twice, in her testimony, she stated that she 
did not consider them to be dangerous. (Tr. 199, 284) On 
another occasion she asserted that the premises were dan-
gerous. (Tr. 284) 
On the night of the accident the plaintiff had been 
in the laundry several hours washing and hanging laundry. 
About an hour before she fell she was joined by her 
daughter, Jessie, who came to her assistance. (Tr. 95, 96, 
184) It was the custom for Jessie to hang the clothes when 
she came to help the plaintiff. (Tr. 88) About eight 
o'clock in the evening the plaintiff went into the west 
laundry room to see if some of the laundry hanging there 
was dry so it could be taken down and replaced with 
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laundry which had just been freshly washed. At this time 
the plaintiff had nothing in her hands as she proceeded into 
this west room. It was while returning that she stubbed her 
toe on the shoulder of the plug and fell. (Tr. 185, 198) 
Prior to her fall plaintiff had made many trips back 
and forth to the west laundry room without mishap. (Tr. 
188, 200) She testified that she was always particular to 
be on the lookout for the plug because she knew of its 
existence and that it should be avoided. (Tr. 199) She 
candidly admits that at the time she fell she was not pay-
ing the attention which she knew she should observe. 
(Tr. 200, 206) 
It was of particular importance that plaintiff should 
be careful to avoid falls. She had an arthritic spine and a 
fused stiff back of many years' standing. (Tr. 99, 105, 
122, 145-147, 205-206) Because of this infirmity plain-
tiff was more susceptible to falls than otherwise and was 
well aware of her condition and was constantly on the 
lookout to avoid situations which would be dangerous to 
one in her condition. As above stated, she admitted that 
she was not observing her usual rule of care when she had 
her accident. 
One of the issues in the trial upon which plaintiff 
placed great stress and which is argued at length in her 
brief was the question of notice. It is asserted that the 
type of clean-out plug involved created a hazardous and 
dangerous condition; that defendant had been warned and 
was well aware of the danger and recklessly did nothing 
about it. It is further asserted that there was a history of 
many people, including plaintiff, members of her family 
and other tenants, having tripped on it. It is the con-
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tention of plaintiff that defendant had no right to use the 
type of plug involved in spite of the plumbing code re-
quirements and usual and customary building practices. 
Five witnesses testified that on a few occasions they had 
stubbed their toes on the plug but significantly none of 
them had ever been hurt in so doing before plaintiff was 
injured. (Tr. 26, 42, 73, 216) Two of these witnesses 
never made any complaint about it or mentioned it to the 
landlord at all. (Tr. 42, 79) Only two of them, plaintiff 
and her son, claim to have made any mention of it to de-
fendant's custodian. It was only mentioned by them on one 
occasiOn. 
The witness, Clegg, formerly employed by defendant, 
testified that he pointed out the plug to defendant's presi-
dent several times but this officer emphatically denies any 
such notice having been given by Clegg. (Tr. 236, 238) 
The only other fact of importance to this appeal is 
that following the accident to plaintiff the drain plug was 
replaced by one of a different type without a protruding 
shoulder but having an inverted shoulder which created a 
hole in the top of the plug the same size as the protusion of 
the previous plug. This replacement did not comply with 
the code and furthermore presented hazards as serious as 
the plug over which plaintiff tripped. (Tr. 82, 216, 217, 
223, 224, 273, 279} 
It is the position of the defendant that this voluntary 
change of the type of plug did not constitute any admis-
sion of liability nor prove that defendant was guilty of 
negligence because it had not made the change before the 
plaintiff was hurt. Nielsen v. Christensen-Gardner, Inc., 
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85 Utah 79, 38 P. 2d 743; Shearman and Redfield on 
Negligence, Volume 1, Section 60, Page 171. 
Much emphasis is placed upon the nature and extent 
of plaintiff's injury. Since no question relating to damages 
is presented in the grounds for reversal, defendant does not 
deem it either necessary or appropriate to discuss this 
subject. 
It is perhaps idle to dwell upon what reasons prompted 
the jury to decide in defendant's favor but it is obvious 
that the jury either did not accept the plaintiff's conten-
tion that defendant was guilty of negligence or found that 
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. In any 
event, the issues were found in defendant's favor. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO ERROR COMMITTED BY 
THE TRIAL COURT IN ADMITTING EXPERT 
TESTIMONY THAT THE SEWER CLEAN-OUT 
PLUG WAS INSTALLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THE PLUMBING CODE OF PROVO CITY OR BY 
ADMITTING THE SAID CODE PROVISIONS IN 
EVIDENCE OR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 15. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR 
BY REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS 3, 5, 8, 11 and 12. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO ERROR COMMITTED BY 
THE TRIAL COURT IN ADMITTING EXPERT 
TESTIMONY THAT THE SEWER CLEAN-OUT 
PLUG WAS INSTALLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THE PLUMBING CODE OF PROVO CITY OR BY 
ADMITTING THE SAID CODE PROVISIONS IN 
EVIDENCE OR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 15. 
The plaintiff urges that because the trial court ad-
mitted in evidence proof that the sewer clean-out plug 
had been installed in compliance with the plumbing code 
of Provo City and admitted into evidence the provisions 
of said code and then gave Instruction No. 15 which re-
cited the pertinent provisions of said code, grievous and 
prejudicial error was committed. 
In addition, the plaintiff makes the subsidiary argu-
ment that the code is inapplicable because it is asserted it 
was enacted merely to achieve sanitation and health pur-
poses and not to provide rules of safety to protect persons 
such as plaintiff and hence was immaterial to any issues 
involved in this case. 
Defendant fails to see any relevancy to the distinction 
sought to be drawn by plaintiff on the purpose of the 
officials of Provo City in adopting the ordinance. It is 
submitted that there is no competent evidence in the 
record of the purpose of its enactment. The admissions 
attributed to the witnesses Wood and Hodgson with re-
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spect to its purpose are completely incompetent and im-
material. These so-called admissions were solicited on cross-
examination and are the mere conclusions of the witnesses 
upon a subject upon which they were not qualified to give 
any opinion. These witnesses were in no way qualified to 
interpret the legal effect or purpose of the ordinance in 
question and defendant should not be bound by the answers 
which they gave on this subject. 
The only relevant issues raised by plaintiff's argument 
are whether the code provisions were admissible in evidence 
and if testimony that the clean-out plug was installed in 
compliance with the code was likewise admissible. If the 
answer to these propositions is in the affirmative then the 
plaintiff's argument is without merit. Plaintiff concedes 
that there was no violation of the plumbing code by the 
defendant. 
The language of the code is couched in mandatory 
language. It says: 
((Clean-outs shall not be less in size than the 
pipe served up to four ( 4) inch pipe. Clean-outs 
for screw pipe and fittings shall be heavy cast brass 
plugs with a solid wrench shoulder not less than one 
inch thick and one inch high * * *" 
The record is clear and without dispute that the 
clean-out plug involved in this case was in exact compli-
ance with this provision and that it was located properly 
and that there was no other substitute permitted by the 
ordinance. (Tr. 209, 210, 231, 255-258, 261-262, 264-
266, 277-279, 293, Exhibit D-12) No attempt was even 
made to contradict this evidence. 
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The law is clear that ordinances are admissible both in 
cases of violation to prove negligence and in cases of com-
pliance to prove absence of negligence. 
In 65 Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec. 240, Page 1061, 
it is stated: 
((Evidence is admissible of the requirements of 
a statute or ordinance and of the violation thereof 
::- * ::· by a person whose negligence is in issue in an 
action for damages ::· * ::·. Conversely, when the 
negligence charged consists in the doing of a par-
ticular act or the employment of a particular 
method, the provisions of an ordinance are admis-
sible to show that such act or method was required 
by its terms." 
In Marshall v. Lyon, (Col.) 177 P. 2d 44, the de-
fendant objected to the admission of a portion of a build-
ing code which the plaintiff claimed the defendant had 
violated. That court said the objection made was un-
tenable and stated: 
((Since the ordinance was properly received in 
evidence the trial court was correct in reading the 
sections received to the jury with other instruc-
tions. * ::- * " 
This authority clearly demonstrates that the plaintiff's 
objections to Instruction No. 15 are without merit. 
In Christensen v. Hennepin Transportation Co. 
(Minn.) 1 0 N. W. 2d 40 6, the court said the following in 
ruling that an ordinance may be proved as an evidentiary 
fact to either prove or disprove negligence in an action for 
damages: 
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nit was not necessary to plead the ordinance. 
An ordinance prescribing standards of conduct, 
being an evidentiary fact in a negligence case, may 
be proved, like any other fact tending to prove or 
disprove negligence as an ultimate fact." 
June v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. (Mich.) 205 
N. W. 181, involved an action wherein it was claimed that 
defendant was negligent for failing to blow a whistle or 
ring a bell at a grade crossing. The question was whether 
negligence could be shown for such failure when the pro-
visions of an ordinance prohibited the use of whistles or 
bells. 
That court said: 
HN egligence cannot be predicated on omitting 
to sound the locomotive whistle, as its use in the 
city is prohibited by the ordinance plaintiff invokes. 
* * ~-" 
And in Larson v. Lowden, (Minn.) 282 N.W. 669, 
it was held that an ordinance prohibiting the unnecessary 
ringing of bells and blowing of whistles on locomotives 
within the corporate limits of the city could be shown as 
an evidentiary fact in a negligence action without being 
pleaded as any other fact tending to prove or disprove the 
ultimate fact of negligence. 
That court said: 
((The cause of action was based on negligence, 
not violation of the ordinance. An ordinance may 
prescribe the duty of a party and is admissible as an 
evidentiary fact for that purpose, both where the 
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violation of the ordinance is asserted as a breach of 
duty t~ prove negligence,* ~ .. ~- and where compli-
ance Wtth the ordinance is claimed as a performance 
of ~uty to show absence of negligence. ~- ::- )'.- The 
ord1nance, therefore, was admissible without hav-
ing been pleaded in the answer, to show the defend-
ants' duty with respect to ringing the bell and 
blowing the whistle." 
On the court's instructions in that case it was stated: 
u::- * * The instructions are to be considered as a 
whole. When so considered, they correctly informed 
the jury that the failure to blow the whistle and 
ring the bell alone was not negligence, since the 
ordinance prohibited the giving of such . warnings 
except when necessary as above st2ted, that de-
fendants were bound to exercise due care in the 
operation of their trains and that it was for the 
jury, to say under all the circumstances whether it 
was the duty of the defendants in the exercise of 
due care to give a warning by ringing the bell or 
blowing the whistle against immediate threatened 
danger, if any, to the plaintiffs. * * *" 
The case of Presley v. Kinloch-Bloomington, Ill. Co. 
158 Ill. App. 220, was an action for wrongful death. 
Plaintiff's decedent was killed while working on an electric 
lamp when an electric wire broke resulting in the electro-
cution of the plaintiff's decedent. Plaintiff was permitted 
to show that the proper method of stringing high tension 
wires was to construct a guard or a net of wires to prevent 
the upper wires from falling on the high tension wires 
below. Defendant attempted to introduce evidence to the 
contrary but was not permitted to do so. This was held to 
be error. 
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The court stated: 
«Whether the maintenance and operation of 
the wires were in accordance with the approved 
and customary method and whether guards or net-
ting was the usual construction were material issues 
in the case. The defendants also offered in evidence 
ordinances of the city which provided for the con-
solidation of wires on any pole or system of poles of 
any other company, under the direction of the city 
electrician; also providing how electric wires 
should be insulated, and further that all telephone 
and telegraph wires should be strung up on the 
same set of poles so far as possible. The ordinance 
in question tended to show that the method of 
construction adopted by the defendant was, in part 
at least, in compliance with the city ordinances, and 
that the telephone company was compelled by the 
same to use the pole in question. The facts shown 
by the ordinance were material to the issues in the 
case and it was error to refuse to admit them in 
evidence." 
In her brief, the plaintiff cites the case of McGettigan 
v. New York Cent. R. Co. (N.Y.) 196 N.E. 745 to sup-
port her claim that the provisions of the ordinance and 
evidence of defendant's compliance therewith were not 
admissible. We submit this case is not in point. In that 
case no issue was raised on the admissibility of the public 
service commission regulation order in question. The court 
simply said that the regulation and evidence of defendant's 
installation of a crossing signal in the middle of a public 
highway under legal authority, which was in evidence be-
fore the court, was not sufficient to excuse the defendant 
from the claim of negligence. 
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Furthermore, in that case the terms of the regulation 
were not mandatory as is the case here involving the Provo 
City Plumbing Code. The terms of that ordinance were 
permissive only. There was left to the judgment of the rail-
road the exercise of some discretion as to where to place 
the signals. On the other hand, the defendant here was 
under a duty to comply with the provisions of the plumb-
ing code which provided it with no alternative or discre-
tion at all. In such circumstances certainly the provisions 
of the plumbing code were at least entitled to be con-
sidered by the jury in passing upon the ultimate question 
of the defendant's alleged negligence. 
Before leaving this phase of the argument, defendant 
desires also to point out that the uncontradicted evidence 
in this record shows that the use and installation of the 
clean-out plug was in accordance with good building and 
construction practices. This evidence alone is sufficient to 
support the verdict of the jury in defendant's favor. 
Trame v. Orpheum Theatre Co. (Ohio) 21 N.E. 2d 
178 at page 180: 
u* * * whether the manner of construction was 
reasonable and proper was a circumstance to be 
considered by the jury in reaching its ultimate con-
clusion on the issue of defendant's negligence, and 
that to assist it in reaching a proper conclusion it 
was entitled to the benefit of the opinion of those 
persons such as architects and builders having spe-
cial familiarity with construction work." 
Blinkinsop v. Weber, (Cal.) 193 P. 2d 96: 
u* * ~'" The opinion of the expert as to whether 
the steps were built in accordance with standard 
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and accepted construction and architectural prac-
tice should have been received. His opinion thereon 
might have been of some assistance in determining 
whether the defendants were negligent in main-
taining the steps. 'l- ~:- * Such evidence was proper 
and relevant to an enlightened consideration of the 
question whether appellant was negligent in the 
maintenance of such a stairhead." 
See also Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 120 Utah 31, 
232 P. 2d 210 and Presley v. Kinloch-Bloomington, Ill. 
Co., supra. 
The plaintiff next complains of Instruction No. 15 on 
the ground that it merely recited the provisions of the 
Provo City Plumbing Code without relating the ordinance 
to the facts of the case. 
Plaintiff bases her argument upon the erroneous 
assumption that provisions of the code were immaterial 
and, therefore, the jury was permitted to speculate that 
the defendant was not liable because the clean-out plug 
was installed as required by the code. 
To support her position the plaintiff cites Meadors v. 
Huffman, (Okla.) 127 P. 2d 806, where the court cor-
rectly ruled that the ordinance had no application to the 
facts of that case. That being so, of course it was error to 
admit the ordinance in evidence. On the other hand, in the 
case at bar the direct issue involved was the alleged negli-
gence of the defendant with respect to the clean-out plug 
installed and maintained on defendant's premises. This 
plug was the basis of plaintiff's claim of negligence against 
defendant. That being so, it was highly competent to show 
that the plumbing code required the use of the plug and 
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that it was installed in compliance with the ordinance. It 
was at the very least for the jury to consider the question 
of whether the use of the plug required by law was negli-
gence. 
The case of Marshall v. Lyon, supra, is a complete 
answer to plaintiff's argument. There the rule is announced 
that it is proper for the court to read the sections of an 
ordinance to the jury with its other instructions. See also 
Larson v. Lowden, supra. 
If anyone was prejudiced by the failure of the court 
to relate the ordinance to the facts it was the defendant, 
not the plaintiff. There is no ground upon which it can be 
inferred that the jury did more than consider the ordinance 
in connection with the issue of whether defendant had 
exercised due care in using the type of clean-out plug 
which the ordinance required. This the jury clearly had a 
right to do and the verdict of the jury was in the affirma-
tive. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR 
BY REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS 3, 5, 8, 11 and 12. 
Plaintiff assigns as error the failure of the trial court 
to give certain of her requested instructions. These re-
quests will be discussed in the order appearing in plaintiff's 
brief. 
As to Instruction No. 3, it is claimed, in effect, that 
since Clegg and Price were managers of defendant and 
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were acting in the scope of their employment, any notice 
to them of a hazardous condition would be notice to the 
defendant. With such a proposition little quarrel could be 
had but the request went further and stated as a fact: 
H:z. :z. ::- that they were each respectively given 
notice by plaintiff and other tenants of the defend-
ant of the existence and hazard of the protruding 
floor plu§ ~~ .. the laundry area furnished by the de-
fendant ··· -~ -~ etc." 
Both the issue of notice and the existence of a hazard 
were facts for the jury to find from a preponderance of 
the evidence and were not the proper subject of a direction 
by the court that the jury was bound to find that the con-
dition in the laundry area was in fact hazardous, or that 
defendant had notice thereof. This part of Instruction No. 
3 was clearly error and was properly refused. If a portion 
of an instruction is bad, the trial court is justified in refus-
ing to give any part of it. Jensen v. Denver & Rio Grande 
Ry. Co., 44 Utah 100 at page 118, 138 Pac. 1185. It is the 
position of defendant that the clean-out plug was not a 
hazard as a matter of law. It was only one inch square and 
only one inch high. By itself it presented no more of a 
hazard than a stairway or a bathtub on which an injury 
could be sustained and which in fact have been the cause 
of many home injuries. Stairways, bathtubs and sewer 
plugs are to be found in every building used for occupancy 
by tenants. It could scarcely be claimed that because people 
are injured in home accidents every day that having such 
facilities constitutes negligence. They constitute the neces-
sary components of modern living and the risk which they 
entail is assumed by everyone. 
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The court gave plaintiff all that she was entitled to in 
instructions, in Instructions No. 2, 4 and 14. By Instruc-
tion No. 2 the court fully covered plaintiff's theory of 
liability by stating that plaintiff was alleging: 
u* * * that there was a metal plug protruding 
above the surface of the floor; that the defendant 
had known for more than two years was a danger-
ous condition and that it might cause injury to its 
tenants using the basement laundry area * * ::-" 
By Instruction No. 4 the jury was instructed that if 
it found: 
u* * * from a preponderance of the evidence that 
the defendant was negligent as claimed and that 
from a like preponderance of the evidence that 
such negligence was the proximate cause of the in-
juries of the plaintiff * * *" 
it would be the jury's duty to find for the plaintiff. 
Furthermore, the plaintiff's theory of liability was fully 
covered by Instruction No. 14. This instruction included 
the statement that notice to the agent of the defendant 
would be notice to the landlord. 
It requires no citation of authority for the proposition 
that where plaintiff's theory of a case is reasonably covered 
the refusal of the court to give repetitious or additional in-
structions is not error. It is only where the jury is insuffi-
ciently advised of the issues to be determined or where the 
jury is misled by the refusal to give an instruction that 
error can be claimed. In re Richards Estate, 5 U tab 2a 
106, 297 P. 2d 542. Harmless error is never ground for 
reversal. Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 5 was nothing 
more than the academic statement of a legal principle and 
was not related to any of the facts under consideration in 
the case. Hence, the trial court properly refused to give it. 
The substance of this instruction was fully covered by In-
structions No. 8, 9, 12 and 21. Instruction No. 8 told the 
jury that reasonable care did not impose the standard of 
the extraordinarily cautious individual upon the plaintiff. 
Instruction No. 9 told the jury that the caution exercised 
by a prudent person varies in accordance to the known 
dangers involved in an undertaking and is not a fixed un-
deviating standard. To the same effect was Instruction 
No. 12. Finally Instruction No. 21 informed the jury 
that merely to be absent-minded or to forget a known 
danger was not necessarily to be considered as negligence 
but was to be considered in the light of surrounding 
circumstances. 
Plaintiff in her brief makes the assertion that the evi-
dence shows that she had no choice but to use the area 
where the clean-out plug was located. This is plainly not 
supported by the record. There were washing facilities pro-
vided for plaintiff's use which made it absolutely unneces-
sary for her to even go into the room where the plug was 
located. (Tr. 22, 31, 35, 39, 44, 71, 78, 88, 159, 190, 202, 
215) The record is conclusive that plaintiff elected not 
from necessity but from choice to use the room for laun-
dry purposes. This she did with the full knowledge of the 
existence of the plug and that other persons had tripped on 
it; (Tr. 283) and further, with the full knowledge that 
a person in her condition might possibly be injured if she 
tripped over it. 
Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 8 was clearly in 
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error. It stated that the plaintiff was not to be charged 
with contributory negligence if. the evidence showed that 
defendant failed to supply any other place in which plain .. 
tiff could do her laundry and that she was, therefore, 
obliged to use the area where she was hurt. As pointed out 
in connection with the argument on plaintiff's request No. 
5, this statement was not in accord with the facts and 
error would have been committed if this request had been 
given. Jensen v. Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co., supra. The 
essential and proper elements of request No.8 were covered 
by instructions No. 2 and 4. 
Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 11 was a defini-
tion of reckless disregard for the safety of another. It is a 
mere academic statement of a legal principle and was not 
related to any of the facts in this case. It was objectionable 
for the same reason that request No. 5 was bad and, there-
fore, the trial court properly refused to give it. There were 
no facts upon which the jury could have found that de-
fendant was guilty of reckless disregard of plaintiff's 
safety. This court has defined reckless misconduct in 
Jensen v. Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co., supra. There it 
was stated that recklessness is: 
u* * * a disregard of consequences; an indif-
ference whether a wrong or an injury is done or 
not; an indifference to the rights of others and of 
the natural and probable consequences." 
Nowhere in this record does it appear that defendant 
exhibited such an attitude as to be indifferent to whether 
plaintiff or any of its other tenants might suffer injuries on 
account of the sewer plug. Furthermore, it is submitted 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
that there is nothing in the record to justify a finding that 
defendant knew that the sewer plug created a hazard or 
that defendant was aware its tenants were frequently trip-
ping over it as argued by plaintiff. 
On the other hand the jury was instructed that de-
fendant was under a duty to exercise reasonable care to 
prevent injury to the plaintiff. (Instruction No. 13) This 
was a correct statement of the obligation resting upon 
defendant. The jury by its verdict found that defendant 
did not violate this duty. 
Lastly, it is asserted that the trial court erroneously 
refused plaintiff's request No. 12. This instruction in sub-
stance was intended to tell the jury that plaintiff was ex-
cused from the defense of contributory negligence if the 
jury found by a preponderance of the evidence that de-
fendant was guilty of ((reckless disregard for the plaintiff's 
safety." We have already pointed out that there are no 
facts upon which such a finding could have been made. We 
defy anyone to point to any fact showing defendant's 
((Disregard of consequences; an indifference 
whether a wrong or an injury is inflicted or not; an 
indifference to the rights of others and of the 
natural and probable consequences." 
Jensen v. Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co., supra. All of the 
proper elements of plaintiff's theory on contributory negli-
gence were covered by Instructions No. 16, 18, 19, 21 and 
22. In order to justify request No. 12 it would be necessary 
as a matter of law to say that the jury could not find that 
the sewer plug was installed in accordance with good build-
ing and construction practices; that it was not the type 
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required by law which made no allowance for any other 
kind of plug; that no person had been injured by it before 
plaintiff was hurt and to affirmatively find that defendant 
knew or should have known that it presented a probability 
of serious injury to the plaintiff or others. Such facts sim-
ply do not appear in this record. For these and other rea-
sons the request was properly denied. It may be true that 
under proper circumstances contributory negligence does 
not apply to a situation where injury is inflicted recklessly 
but that does not en tide the party to such an instruction 
where the evidence clearly does not justify its application. 
Plaintiff concedes this proposition to be correct by quoting 
the case of Beckstrom v. Williams, 3 Utah 2d 210, 282 P. 
2d 309. 
It is submitted that there is nothing present in plain-
tiff's argument which would justify even an inference that 
the jury in this case was in any way misled by the court's 
refusal to instruct or that the court's instructions omitted 
any vital or necessary issue which the jury was bound to 
consider which in any way prejudiced the substantial 
rights of the plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
From the record in this case it clearly appears that 
defendant was entitled to have the Provo City Plumbing 
Code admitted in evidence and to show that the defendant 
complied with its provisions in installing and maintaining 
the clean-out plug. It was also proper for the trial court 
to instruct the jury on the provisions of said ordinance. 
The record further shows that no prejudice to the 
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plaintiff occurred by the refusal of the trial court to give 
plaintiff's requested instructions. 
The jury having determined the issues in favor of the 
defendant and against the plaintiff, the verdict and judg-
ment of the trial court in this case must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER, 
ALBERT R. BOWEN, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents 
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